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IN THE SUPREME COURT

O'------------·-· .
Cl... SupNIM

Court. Utah

THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

WESLEY MULHERIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING

- vs Case No. 17027
INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
---0000000---

The respondent, Ingersoll-Rand Company, pursuant to Rule
76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby petitions
this Court for a rehearing of the matter.
The respondent submits the following points for rehearing
and its brief in support thereof:
1.

The adoption of comparative principles in strict pro-

ducts liability should parallel the standard of comparison set
forth in the Utah Comparative Negligence Act.
2.

Where comparative principles are applied in strict

liability cases, all of the conduct of the plaintiff that contributes to the cause of the accident should be considered.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

WESLEY MULHERIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 17027

- vs -

INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.
---0000000---

INGERSOLL-RAND COMPANY'S BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The statement of kind of case is as set forth in the respondent's original brief on file herein.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The disposition in lower court is as set forth in the respondent's original brief on file herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts is as set forth in the appellant's
original brief on file herein.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES IN
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY SHOULD PARALLEL
THE STANDARD OF COMPARISON SET FORTH IN
THE UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT.
In 1973, the Utah Legislature adopted the Utah Comparative
Negligent Act and determined, as the basis of recovery, that:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action • . . to recover damages . . . if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery
is sought • . . .
[Section 78-27-37,
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1953).]
The Utah Legislature has repeatedly refused to change this policy
to the "pure comparative negligence" standard this Court has now
adopted for products liability cases, as set forth in its opinion
in this matter.

S.B. 271, 4lst Session, Utah State Legislature

(1975); S.B. 123, 43rd Session, Utah State Legislature {1979).
Indeed, even a change to a 50-50 comparative principle proposed
in the 1981 session was not enacted.

S.B. 256, 44th Session,

Utah State Legislature .(1981).
The repeated refusal of the Legislature to alter its policy
concerning the standard of recovery in comparative negligence is
a clear indication that the policy of comparative principles to
be utilized in this state is as set forth in the Utah Comparative
Negligence Act, supra.

This standard requires that the fault or

negligence of the plaintiff be less than that of the defendant
before the plaintiff can recover a percentage of his damages.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-3Contrary to this policy, the Court adopted "pure comparative"
principles in products liability cases in its opinion herein,
stating that:
The defense in a products liability case, where
both defect and misuse contribute to cause the
damaging event, will limit the plaintiff's recovery to that portion of his damages equal to
the percentage of the cause contributed by the
product defect.
[Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
No. 17027, May 4, 1981.]
The adoption of "pure comparative fault" principles in products liability cases creates a double standard in the State of
Utah which not only violates the policy established by the Utah
Legislature, but creates substantial conceptional problems for
the courts of this state and places an unfair burden upon manufacturers and distributors of products.
Assume the following facts:

John Doe, a construction worker,

is about to fill his water truck by using a city fire hydrant.
When he opens the water valve of the hydrant, it explodes and
seriously injures him.

He sues the manufacturer of the hydrant

for defective product, the city for improper and- negligent maintenance of the hydrant, and the contractor (not his employer) who
negligently installed the hydrant.

The jury determines that the

plaintiff misused the hydrant in the manner in which he operated
it, the contractor negligently installed it, the city negligently
failed to maintain it, and the hydrant was defective in manufacture.
suppose further, the following jury allocations of fault:
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-4Plaintiff

40%

City

20%

Contractor

20%

Manufacturer

20%

Pursuant to this finding, the city and the contractor would
not be joint tortfeasors, as defined by the Utah Comparative
Negligence Act, supra, since their negligence, or gross negligence, is less than that of the plaintiff.

Thus, would the

plaintiff recover 60% of his damages from a manufacturer that
was only 20% at fault?

Or, under the specific holding set forth

by this Court herein, would the plaintiff recover only 20% of
his damages, which is "that portion of his damages equal to the
percentage of the cause contributed by the product defect."
Mulherin vs. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra.
More importantly, however, is the question of any recovery
against the manufacturer in this situation.

Why should a manu-

facturer or distributor of a product that is less at fault than
any of the other parties, including the plaintiff, be held liable
for damages under this situation when the other defendants, that
are equally or more at fault, are dismissed with no cause of
action?

This is the result of the double standard created by

this Court's holding herein.
The Court stated that it would not express an opinion as to
other issues created by its holding herein.

However, the result
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-5of the holding must be analyzed to illuminate the problems
created by this double standard of comparative principles.
As previously noted, the Utah Legislature adopted the Comparative Negligence Act in 1973.

Subsequently, the Legislature

enacted the Utah Products Liability Act, Section 78-15-1, et
~.,Utah

Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1953).

It is significant

that the Legislature did not alter the existing comparative negligence standard whatsoever when establishing the Utah Products
Liability Act.

In construing legislative intent, it is a well-

established principle that the Legislature is presumed to be
cognizant of its prior legislative enactments and judicial decisions.

Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 wash. 2d 847 (1976), 557

P.2d 1306; State v. Cutnose, 87 N.M. 300 (1975), 532 P.2d 889;
Dept. of Revenue v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 169 Mont. 202
(1976), 545 P.2d 1083; Alter v. Michael, 50 Cal. Rptr. 553, 413
P.2d 153, 64 C.2d 480 (1966).
The refusal of the Legislature to alter its stand on the
standard of comparison as set forth in the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, supra, when it adopted the Utah Products Liability
Act, supra,

is a clear indication that the Legislature did not

intend to treat manufacturers and distributors of products differently from anyone else!

To the contrary, the policy of the

Legislature was to attempt to more fairly equalize the burdens
of manufacturers and distributors of products.
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The policy of the Legislature in adopting the Utah Products
Liability Act was set forth in Section 78-15-2, Utah Code AnnotatE
(Repl. Vol. 1953), as follows:
Legislature findings and declarations--Purpose
of act.--(1) The legislature finds and declares
that the number of suits and claims for damages
and the amount of judgments and settlements
arising from defective products has increased
greatly in recent years. Because of these increases, the insurance industry has substantially
increased the cost of product liability insurance.
The effect of increased insurance premiums and
increased claims has increased product cost
through manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers
passing the cost of premiums to the consumer.
Further, certain product manufacturers are discouraged from continuing to provide and manufacture such products because of the high cost and
possible unavailability of product liability insurance.
(2)
In view of these recent trends, and
for the purpose of alleviating the adverse
effects which these trends are producing in the
manufacturing industry, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide product liability
insurance . . . .
Obviously, this Court's ruling herein directly contravenes
this legislative statement of public policy.

The manufacturer or

distributor of a product may now be held liable for damages even
though his "fault" is less than the "fault," "negligence" or "gross
negligence" of other defendants, all of whom may be dismissed froo
the action because of the greater faulty conduct or misconduct on
the part of the plaintiff.

Such a result is grossly unfair,

esta~

lishes additional "adverse effects" on the manufacturing industry
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and ignores the public policy established by the Utah State Legislature.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the case of Thibault
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (1978), as cited in this
Court's opinion herein, was faced with the identical problem. The
New Hampshire Court properly avoided the double standard that is
created by adopting differing comparative principles.

The New

Hampshire Legislature adopted a comparative negligence statute
which established that a plaintiff can recover if the jury does
not find that his negligence was greater than the causal negligence of the defendant.

R.S.A. 507:7-a {N.H. Supp. 1977).

The

Court then judicially recognized the comparative concept in strict
liability cases "parallel to the Legislature's recognition."

Id.

at 850. In so doing, the New Hampshire Court adopted the same
comparative standard for recovery for the plaintiff so long as
his misconduct which contributed to the injury was not greater
than that of the manufacturer.
The respondent submits that if comparative principles in
products liability cases are to be applied as the law of this
jurisdiction, then the policy established by the Utah Legislature
as the standard of recovery should be applied here.
II
WHERE COMPARATIVE PRINCIPLES ARE APPLIED
IN STRICT LIABILITY CASES, ALL OF THE
CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF THAT CONTRIBUTES
TO THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED.
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With the adoption of comparative principles in strict products liability actions, whether by "pure" comparison or in
accordance with the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, supra, it is
necessary to determine quest1ons of law relative to the defenses
available to the defendant in such cases.

Rule 76, Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, provides, in part, that:
If a new trial is granted, the court shall
pass upon and determine all questions of
law involved in the case presented upon
appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case.
[Emphasis added.]
This Court, in Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 {Utah
1979), established only two defenses to products liability claims,

namely, "(l) misuse of the product by the user or consumer
and (2) knowledge of the defect by the user or consumer, who is
aware of the danger and yet unreasonably proceeds to make use of
the product, i.e., assumption of the risk."

Id. at 158.

The Hahn case preceded the Legislature's adoption of the Utah
Comparative Negligence Act, supra, and was not an issue therein.
The Utah Comparative Negligence Act, supra, provides for the
application of comparative principles to negligence, gross negligence, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.
This Court has now adopted comparative principles in products
liability cases in this matter.

In products liability cases,

there are generally three categories of conduct by the injured
party that must be considered.

They are contributory negligence,

assumption of risk, and misuse or abuse of the product.

There is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9also the wrongful conduct of other non-manufacturer/distributor
defendants to be considered.

Obviously, there is a wide variety

in degree of misconduct that falls into each category and, indeed,
a great deal of overlapping occurs.

These "labeling" difficulties

were noted by this Court in two comparative negligence cases.
First in Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Assoc., 563 P.2d 1247
(1977), and, more recently, the distinctions between, and the
intermingling of, the theories of contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk were discussed by this Court in Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., No. 16672, May 22, 1981.
The problems created by trying to make these distinctions in
products liability cases have been eliminated by adoption of comparative principles in some jurisdictions.

In California, where

pure comparative negligence was adopted in Liv. Yellow Cab Co.,
532 P.2d 1126, the Supreme Court, in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
20 Cal.2d 725, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978), adopted the comparative
standard in products liability cases and, further, allowed consideration of all types of conduct by the plaintiff that contributed
to the cause of the accident in determining the percentage of fault
attributable to him.

The Court concluded that, "plaintiff's

recovery will be reduced only to the extent that his own lack of
reasonable care contributed to his injury."

Id. at 1168.

The California Court analyzed the problem of intermingling and
overlapping of the defenses and stated:
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-10The syllogism runs, contributory negligence was
only a defense to negligence, comparative negligence only affects contributory negligence,
therefore comparative negligence cannot be a
defense to strict liability.
[See Butaud v.
Suburban Marine & Sport Goods, Inc. (Alaska
1976), 555 P.2d 42, 47. While fully recognizing the theoretical and semantic distinctions between the twin principles of strict
products liability and traditional negligence,
we think they can be blended or accommodated
. • . • We acknowledged an intermixing of
defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk and formally effected a
type of merger . . . .
Id. at 1167.
We think, accordingly, the conclusion may
fairly be drawn that the terms "comparative
negligence," "contributory negligence" and
"assumption of risk" do not, standing alone,
lend themselves to the exact measurements of
amicrometer-caliper, or to such precise definition as to divert us from otherwise strong
and consistent countervailing policy considerations.
Fixed semantic consistency at this
point is less important than the attainment
of a just and equitable result.
The interweaving of concept and terminology in this
area suggests a judicial posture that is
flexible rather than doctrinaire. Id. at 1168.
We do not permit plaintiff's own conduct relative to the product to escape unexamined, and
as to that share of plaintiff's damages which
flows from his own fault we discern no reason
of policy why it should, following Li, be
borne by others. Such a result woul"Crdirectly
contravene the principle announced in Li, that
loss should be assessed equitably in proportion to fault.
We conclude, accordingly, that the expressed
purposes which persuaded us in the first
instance to adopt strict liability in California would not be thwarted were we to apply
comparative principles. What would be forfeit
is a degree of semantic symmetry.
However, in
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this evolving area of tort law in which new
remedies are judicially created, and old defenses judicially merged, impelled by strong
consideration of equity and fairness, we seek
a larger synthesis. If a more just result
follows from the expansion of comparative
principles, we have no hesitancy in seeking
it, mindful always that the fundamental and
underlying purpose of Li was to promote the
equitable allocation or-loss among all
parties legally responsible in proportion to
their fault. Id. at 1169.
Thus, the California Court that lead the way in adopting the
theory of strict products liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, has
now recognized the difficulty in making the distinctions between
these various defenses and, therefore, has eliminated them.
Other authorities have determined that negligence on the part
of the plaintiff, other than the failure to discover or guard
against a defect, is recognized as a defense.
The standard of strict products liability that was adopted
by this Court in Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., supra, is set forth in
Restatement (2d) Law of Torts, Section 402a.

As noted in

comment n of that section, contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense only when such negligence consists merely
in a failure to discover the defect in the product or to guard
against the possibility of its existence.

The Restatement does

not preclude other forms of contributory negligence as a defense
to products liability claims.
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-12This defense was noted in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
336 So.2d 80 {Fla. 1976).

The Florida Supreme Court stated that

We recognize that contributory negligence of
the user or consumer or bystander in the sense
of a failure to discover a defect, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence, is
not a defense. Contributory negligence of the
consumer or user by unreasonable use of a product after discovery of the defect and the
danger is a valid defense.
Prior to the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine, a
plaintiff's conduct as the sole proximate
cause of his injuries would constitute a total
defense. See Coleman v. American Universal of
Florida, rnc:-, 264 So.2d 451 (Fla. Appl. 1st
1972), quoting from 2 Furner and Friedman
Products Liability, Section 16.01(3), at 3-20
to 3-31. The defendant manufacturer may
assert that the plaintiff was negligent in some
specified manner other than failing to discover
or guard against a defect, such as assuming the
risk, or misusing the product, and that such
negligence was a substantial proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries or damages.
See Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1100-1101. The fact that
plaintiff acts or fails to act as a reasonable,
prudent person, and such conduct proximately
contributes to his injury, constitutes a valid
defense.
In other words, lack of ordinary due
care could constitute a defense to strict tort
liability.
As noted, the Florida Court relied upon Annot., Products
bility:

Li~

Strict Liability in Tort, 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1101, whereii

the following statement appears:
Also, the defendant may assert that the plaintiff was negligent in some specified manner
other than failing to discover or guard against
a defect, assuming the risk, or misusing the
product, and that such negligence was a substantial, proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries or damages.
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The issue of comparison of all the conduct of the plaintiff is
important in the retrial of this matter.

In the trial, the jury

never reached the issues of assumption of risk or other negligent
conduct on the part of Mr. Mulherin.

The jury was instructed to

return a verdict upon a finding of misuse by the plaintiff.
Since only the issue of misuse by Mr. Mulherin has been determined relative to the available defenses, the retrial of this
matter must consider other available defenses.

The respondent

respectfully submits that all of the negligent conduct of Mr.
Mulherin, or any other person or entity that might be involved,
should be considered in apportioning the relative degrees of
"fault," as has been done in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
supra.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the policy of the
State of Utah has been clearly established by the Legislature as
it relates to the principles of comparative fault.

This Court

should not adopt a policy of pure comparative fault in products
liability cases where the Legislature has repeatedly refused to
adopt such a policy in relation to the Utah Comparative Negligence
Act.

This Court should avoid the creation of a double standard

and adopt a comparative system parallel with that established by
the Utah Legislature.
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With the application of comparative principles to strict pre
ducts liability cases, all of the conduct of the parties should t
considered in establishing the relative degrees of fault attributable to each.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of June, 1981.

Ricijard H. ,Moffat/ .· J;
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Suite 300, 261 Rast Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ohn- L~ung

··ftorn /or D
ndant-Respondent
Suite(.3_0-0, 261 East Broadway
Salt ta'ke City, Utah 84111
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